Accident Alpi Pioneer 300 37AHH,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 243790
 
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Date:Saturday 10 October 2020
Time:c. 16:45
Type:Silhouette image of generic PNR3 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Alpi Pioneer 300
Owner/operator:Silvair Services
Registration: 37AHH
MSN: 5006
Fatalities:Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:3
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Category:Accident
Location:Loches -   France
Phase: En route
Nature:Private
Departure airport:Chatellerault/Targe Airfield (LFCA)
Destination airport:Chatellerault/Targe Airfield (LFCA)
Investigating agency: BEA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
A Robin DR.400/140 Major (F-BXEU) and an Alpi Pioneer 300 (37AHH) crashed near Loches, France, following a mid-air collision. All five occupants died in the accident.
The DR.400 had departed Poitiers-Biard Airport (PIS/LFBI) while the Pioneer departed Chatellerault/Targe Airfield (LFCA) for an overflight of several castles in the Loire area.
After the collision, the Pioneer crashed on a stone fence and burst into flames. The DR.400 impacted vegetation.

Contributing factors
The mid-air collision between F-BXEU and 37AHH resulted from a lack of visual contact between the two pilots who were flying over the same point of interest on the ground, namely Loches château. The two aircraft were operating in class G airspace, in which separation between aircraft is essentially based solely on the "see and avoid" rule. The BEA has, in several investigations, shown the limits of this concept. The investigation was not able to determine whether the pilots were aware of the presence of the other aircraft manoeuvring in the immediate vicinity. This collision occurred in a context where the pilots were not in contact with any flight information service that could provide them with information about the presence of the other aircraft. As a result of this collision, both aircraft lost part of their left wing making it impossible for the pilots to maintain control. The 37AHH airframe parachute was activated, but its incorrect deployment meant that the consequences of the loss of control were not limited. F-BXEU did not have any recovery system.
Both aircraft collided with the ground.
While the circumstances of this mid-air collision are independent of the location of the two aircraft bases, the investigation has shown that, in the context of these two flights, the pilots should not have flown further than 40 km from their respective bases. Failure to comply with this limitation, which applies to aircraft used for revenue flights, leaves room for a greater concentration of aircraft in the vicinity of points of interest and thus tends to increase the likelihood of a mid-air collision.
The following factors may have contributed to the absence of visual contact between the two pilots:
• the possibility that the attention of the two pilots was focused on their respective paths over Loches château, which in the configuration of the collision, were opposing;
• the possibility that the pilots' attention was diverted by the desire to satisfy the passengers, who were also customers who had purchased sightseeing flights directly from the organisations that the pilots managed;
• the absence of electronic equipment to help detect aircraft on board F-BXEU and 37AHH;
• the impossibility of benefiting from flight information, as neither pilot had contacted the Poitiers FIS at the time of the collision;
• the position of the sun in the sky, hindering the pilot of F-BXEU in his visual detection of 37AHH.
The following factors may have contributed to the incorrect deployment of the 37AHH airframe parachute:
• the cables connecting the airframe parachute to the structure of the microlight being assembled in a way which did not withstand the loads specified by the manufacturer, Alpi Aviation;
• the possibility that the microlight was in an unusual configuration, both in terms of its attitude and its integrity, at the time of the activation of the parachute

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: BEA
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 5 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://www.lanouvellerepublique.fr/loches/loches-crash-d-un-aeronef-a-la-sortie-du-centre-ville
https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/collision-mortelle-entre-un-ulm-et-un-avion-de-tourisme-a-loches-quatre-decestour-1602347750

Images:


Figure: BEA France

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
10-Oct-2020 16:53 gerard57 Added
10-Oct-2020 17:05 Iceman 29 Updated [Source]
10-Oct-2020 17:29 harro Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Source, Narrative]
10-Oct-2020 18:05 Iceman 29 Updated [Source, Embed code]
10-Oct-2020 18:06 Iceman 29 Updated [Embed code]
10-Oct-2020 18:25 RobertMB Updated [Time, Source, Embed code, Narrative]
10-Oct-2020 19:46 harro Updated [Category]
11-Oct-2020 10:06 RobertMB Updated [Time, Departure airport, Narrative, Category]
12-Oct-2020 05:54 harro Updated [Destination airport, Narrative, Category]

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