ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 24667
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| Date: | Tuesday 15 March 2005 |
| Time: | 11:56 |
| Type: |  Socata TB20 Trinidad |
| Owner/operator: | Private |
| Registration: | F-GEVA |
| MSN: | |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Location: | Bourg-en-Bresse, Ain 01 -
 France
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Training |
| Departure airport: | Melun |
| Chambery Aix- les-Bains | |
| Investigating agency: | BEA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
During a training flight to flight rules , from Aerodrome Melun (77) and to Chambery Aix- lesBains (73) , the crew plans to conduct a touch and go on the airfield at Bourg-en-Bresse . The pilot in the left seat . The passenger in the right seat, handles radio communications.
The flight of the aerodrome information service is not activated when the crew reaches the vertical of Bourg Airfield. The crew made recognition and finds no aircraft in the traffic pattern . He decided to integrate downwind for touch and go on runway 18 coated .
The pilot completed a landing slightly 'long and fast ' with flaps in "landing" position. While rolling , it sets the command
shutters on setting " off ", then apply full power to take off. During the ride , he found that the shutters remained
in "landing" position and decides to abort . braking is ineffective . The aircraft departed the runway longitudinally on some
tens of meters.
After the event, it is found that the electrical circuit breaker shutter was triggered position. It was not possible
determine the cause of the failure. The operator informs the pilot restrictions on use of equipment of this aircraft model , powered by an electric circuit of fourteen volts.
The crew was not sure of the configuration of the aircraft before applying the power to take off again . The decision to abort was therefore delayed, and intervened when the aircraft was a significant lift and high speed , which does not allow effective braking .
The operations manual states that the passenger in the right seat can provide radio communications, but control functions , management Machine and navigation should remain the responsibility of the driver which can not be that in the left seat .
The pilots used to fly together. The significant experience passenger's ability to promote reduced alertness of the driver.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2005/f-va050315/pdf/f-va050315.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 27-Sep-2008 01:00 | ASN archive | Added |
| 13-Dec-2014 10:59 | Dr. John Smith | Updated [Time, Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Other fatalities, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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