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| Date: | Wednesday 24 August 2005 |
| Time: | 06:22 UTC |
| Type: |  Airbus A340-313 |
| Owner/operator: | SAS Scandinavian Airlines |
| Registration: | LN-RKF |
| MSN: | 413 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2001 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-5C4 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 256 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Shanghai-Pudong International Airport (PVG/ZSPD) -
 China
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Shanghai Pudong International Airport (ZSPD) |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources |
Flight SK998, an Airbus A340-300 registered LN-RKF, started the takeoff roll at Shanghai Pudong International Airport (ZSPD) airport’s runway 35. On board were 244 passengers, 9 cabin crew and 3 pilots.
When aircraft rotated for takeoff, the tail of the aircraft scraped the runway until the aircraft became airborne. The tail strike occurred because the rotation speed was less than required for the actual airplane takeoff mass.
The aircraft was landed after 3 hours and 29 minutes airborne with Fuel Jettison to reduce landing weight.
The aircraft had an 8 meter long scratch marks to the ventral part of fuselage. Severe fuselage skin abrasion damage through to structure between frames 70 and 74; stringers and fasteners abraded and damaged; aft toilet service panel door and aperture completely abraded. Internal damage; Internal structure displaced and deformed, cracking, stringer and stringer couplings damaged.
The rotation speed had erroneously been computed based on an aircraft weight that was too low. The weight that was used was the preliminary Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) instead of the actual Takeoff weight.
The substitution error led to miscalculation of takeoff data, which in turn resulted in too low thrust setting and excessively low takeoff speed.
The system defences did not ensure that such errors were detected nor did the commander (CDR) and the Pilot Flying (PF) detect the error during their final checklist reading.
The airplane Flight Management System itself did not provide a final defence against mismatched information being programmed.
Takeoff Data Computer (TODC) was programmed by the Relief Pilot (FR) with a takeoff weight (180.000) less than maximum ZFW ( 181.000) for the aircraft and thereby it produced a takeoff speed of a magnitude just barely above VMCG/VMCA. (Speed which was entered: V1 129, VR 130, V2 139 (should have been V1 150, VR 158, V2 164)
These data (speeds) were then inserted in the MCDU by the CDR. The PF (First Officer) should then check those data against the Takeoff data calculation (TODC).
The result of the occurrence shows that this could not have been done in practices. The speed was checked by CDR and PF according to SOP, but the fault was never disclosed. The Flight deck crew performed the flight planning and briefing in the hotel lobby and on board the crew bus. All the necessary documents were not available at the time, but issued later on the flight deck. The CDR was occupied elsewhere during cockpit preparation and delegated duties to FR. When CDR returned to the cockpit, all preparation was done and final load sheet figures were already recorded on to the RODOS. CDR checked RODOS and inserted takeoff speeds into the MCDU. The crew did not follow Standard Operation Procedures with regard to flight preparation, flight planning briefing, cockpit pre-flight preparation, and takeoff and climb procedures. The crew did not find procedure for handling a tail strike occurrence.
The FR misread the preliminary load info and entered ZFW iso TOW into the TODC. He did not update figures when receiving final load sheet.
The PF over-rotated the aircraft in the strive to get the aircraft airborne in spite of indication that was available to him, at the time, to do otherwise. The crew misinterpreted cabin pressurization indication thereby continued the climb until cabin pressure warning was activated.
Sources:
http://multimedia.jp.dk/archive/00062/Klevan-rapporten__pd_62785a.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 25-Jan-2021 17:11 | harro | Added |
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