ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 247339
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| Date: | Thursday 4 October 2018 |
| Time: | 08:45 LT |
| Type: |  Dassault Falcon 2000EX |
| Owner/operator: | Cat Aviation AG |
| Registration: | HB-IAU |
| MSN: | 014 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2003 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 5 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | near Zurich -
 Switzerland
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) |
| Paris-Le Bourget Airport (LBG/LFPB) | |
| Investigating agency: | STSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
The Falcon 2000EX jet took off at 06:43 UTC from Zurich Airport's runway 28 for a flight to Paris. Two pilots were on board, with a flight attendant and two passengers. The commander was the pilot flying (PF), the co-pilot the pilot monitoring (PM).
As the aircraft was climbing through Flight Level (FL) 70 about two minutes after take-off, the flight crew heard a dull bang and noticed the failure of the right engine. The copilot tried to inform the air traffic controller about the engine failure and realised that radio No. 2 was inoperative.
Using radio No. 1, he repeated the transmission, this time successfully, and requested immediate radar guidance for a return to Zurich Airport ("request immediate vectors to come back to Zurich"). Air traffic control responded to this request without delay and told them they could expect an instrument approach to runway 14. At 06:48 UTC, air traffic control asked whether the flight crew was ready for the instrument approach, but they replied in the negative.
The flight crew realised that the autopilot and the elevator trim had also failed. At the suggestion of the copilot, right bus-tie (rotary switch) was closed and both systems worked again. Subsequently, the copilot worked through the checklist "engine failure in flight", which also included the closing of the bus tie. In addition, because of the bang, the commander decided not to attempt an engine restart.
The copilot repeatedly advised the commander to declare an emergency, which he did at 06:52 UTC with the words "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday". Air traffic control confirmed the receipt of this message and again asked the flight crew to report their readiness for the instrument approach. Shortly thereafter, air traffic control continued radar guidance with the instruction to turn onto a heading of 210° and cleared the flight to an altitude of 4000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL).
At 06:54 UTC the flight crew reported that they were now ready for the approach, whereupon they immediately received an instruction to turn to a heading of 170° and were cleared for the instrument approach to runway 14. However, as the aircraft was turning east in a left turn away from the final approach track, air traffic control then suggested heading corrections to the flight crew to lead the HB-IAU back to the final approach track.
At 06:56 UTC, air traffic control asked whether the airport was in sight. The flight crew answered in the negative and reported that they were now following the instrument approach ("established"). The air traffic control then gave the landing clearance, together with a wind from 040 degrees with 3 knots. The landing on runway 14 took place at 06:59 UTC. The flight crew expressed their appreciation for the support and rolled to the assigned parking position.
STSB Conclusions:
The engine shutdown was due to the fact that the emergency fuel shut-off valve was activated because of its incorrect rigging and, as a result, interrupted the fuel supply. The cause of the incorrect rigging could not be conclusively established.
The manufacturer has revised the maintenance specification in October 2019 for ease of comprehension, and planned to supplement the instructions in June 2021 to check the freedom of movement of the Bowden cable during the reset of the fuel shut-off valve rigging procedure.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
STSB
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 01-Feb-2021 10:22 | harro | Added |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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