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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 247849
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Time:03:30 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic A319 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Airbus A319-112
Owner/operator:Tatarstan Airlines
Registration: VQ-BNF
MSN: 3331
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants:
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Category:Serious incident
Location:Kazan International Airport (KZN/UWKD) -   Russia
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:
Destination airport:Kazan International Airport (KZN/UWKD)
Confidence Rating: Accident Investigation report not yet completed, but information verified through official sources
The Airbus A319, VQ-BNF, began a premature descent at night to Kazan Airport. Visibility at Kazan was poor with a cloud base at 30 meters (100 ft) and a visibility of 800 meters (2625 ft).
On reaching an altitude of 13 meters, the airplane was 375 meters away from the runway 29R threshold. At an altitude of 5 meters, having determined that the airplane was not landing, the crew abruptly pulled on the control stick, causing the airplane to soar from less than 1 meter to a height of 7 meters. Instead of going around, the crew brought the airplane into a smooth descent, after which it landed safely.

Ten minutes later an Ural Airlines Airbus A321 also began a premature descent, striking a localizer antenna during a go around.
After the incidents, the ILS for runway 12L/29R was Notamed unserviceable.

The investigation showed that the characteristics of the glide path radio beacon of runway 29R did not meet the established requirements, which was due to violation of the manufacturing process and the use of obsolete high-frequency cables in the manufacturing plant.
Under the conditions of decreasing ambient temperature, the phases of the signals feeding the lower and middle antenna changed by different values, causing "unphasing" of the antenna system. The difference in phase at lowering the temperature was 53 (the maximum permissible difference in phase during operation is 8). More than sixfold "de-phasing" resulted in significant changes in all output parameters of the glideslope beacon.

METAR about the time of the incident:
UWKD 242330Z 11002MPS 0900 R29R/P1500 FZFG VV001 M23/M26 Q1006 798/0050 NOSIG RMK QBB030 QFE743/0991

Sources: (Photo) (Ministry of Emergency Situations, Tatarstan region)


Photo of VQ-BNF courtesy

Antalya (LTAI / AYT)
25 August 2013; (c) Danny Grew

Revision history:

15-Feb-2021 17:13 harro Updated [Total occupants, Departure airport, Narrative]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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