ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 276207
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Date: | Friday 4 March 2022 |
Time: | 11:20 LT |
Type: | Sikorsky S-92A |
Owner/operator: | HM Maritime and Coastguard Agency |
Registration: | G-MCGY |
MSN: | 920257 |
Year of manufacture: | 2014 |
Total airframe hrs: | 2541 hours |
Cycles: | 3880 flights |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4 |
Other fatalities: | 1 |
Aircraft damage: | None |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | Helipad, Derriford Hospital, Pymouth, Devon -
United Kingdom
|
Phase: | Landing |
Nature: | Ambulance |
Departure airport: | Newquay-Cornwall Airport (NQY/EGHQ) |
Destination airport: | Helipad, Derriford Hospital, Pymouth, Devon |
Investigating agency: | AAIB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:The Sikorsky S-92A helicopter, G-MCGY, was engaged on a Search and Rescue mission to extract a casualty near Tintagel, Cornwall and fly them to hospital for emergency treatment. The helicopter flew to Derriford Hospital (DH), Plymouth which has a Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) located in a secured area within one of its public car parks. During the approach and landing, several members of the public in the car park were subjected to high levels of downwash from the landing helicopter. One person suffered fatal injuries, and another was seriously injured.
The investigation identified the following causal factors:
1. The persons that suffered fatal and serious injuries were blown over by high levels of downwash from a landing helicopter when in publicly accessible locations near the DH HLS.
2. Whilst helicopters were landing or taking off, uninvolved persons were not prevented from being present in the area around the DH HLS that was subject to high levels of downwash.
The investigation identified the following contributory factors:
1. The HLS at DH was designed and built to comply with the guidance available at that time, but that guidance did not adequately address the issue of helicopter downwash.
2. The hazard of helicopter downwash in the car parks adjacent to the HLS was not identified, and the risk of possible injury to uninvolved persons was not properly assessed.
3. A number of helicopter downwash complaints and incidents at DH were recorded and investigated. Action was taken in each case to address the causes identified, but the investigations did not identify the need to manage the downwash hazard in Car Park B, so the actions taken were not effective in preventing future occurrences.
4. Prior to this accident, nobody at DH that the AAIB spoke to was aware of the existence of Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 1264, which includes additional guidance on downwash and was published after the HLS at DH was constructed. The document was not retrospectively applicable to existing HLS.
5. The operator of G-MCGY was not fully aware of the DH HLS Response Team staff’s roles, responsibilities, and standard operating procedures.
6. The commander of G-MCGY believed that the car park surrounding the DH HLS would be secured by the hospital’s HLS Response Team staff, but the co‑pilot believed these staff were only responsible for securing the HLS.
7. The DH staff responsible for the management of the HLS only considered the risk of downwash causing harm to members of the public within the boundary of the HLS and all the mitigations focused on limiting access to this space.
8. The DH staff responsible for the management of the HLS had insufficient knowledge about helicopter operations to safely manage the downwash risk around the site.
9. The HLS safety management processes at DH did not result in effective interventions to address the downwash hazard to people immediately outside the HLS.
10. HLS safety management processes at DH did not identify that the mitigations for the downwash hazard were not working well enough to provide adequate control of the risk from downwash.
11. Communication between helicopter operators and DH was ineffective in ensuring that all the risks at the DH HLS were identified and appropriately managed.
12. Safety at hospital HLS throughout the UK requires effective information sharing and collaboration between HLS Site Keepers and helicopter operators but, at the time of the accident, there was no convenient mechanism for information sharing between them.
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | AAIB |
Report number: | AAIB-28045 |
Status: | |
Duration: | 1 year and 8 months |
Download report: | |
|
Sources:
1.
https://www.plymouthhospitals.nhs.uk/latest-news/helipad-incident-4-march-2022-5391 2.
https://news.sky.com/story/plymouth-woman-in-her-80-dies-after-incident-involving-coastguard-helicopter-landing-at-a-hospital-12557874 3.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10579841/Woman-80s-dies-HM-Coastguard-helicopter-lands-hospital-helipad.html 4.
https://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/news/plymouth-news/plymouth-helicopter-death-investigation-launched-6757405 5.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/05/helicopter-landing-at-derriford-hospital-kills-87-year-old-woman-in-plymouth 6.
https://www.itv.com/news/2022-03-05/plymouth-woman-dies-after-plymouth-helicopter-incident 7.
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/breaking-woman-80s-dies-another-26392087 8.
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-devon-60630871 9.
https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=406ee7&lat=50.500&lon=-4.647&zoom=10.7&showTrace=2022-03-04×tamp=1646391310
10.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/aaib-current-field-investigations/air-accidents-investigation-branch-current-field-investigations Location
Media:
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
05-Mar-2022 15:59 |
Dr. John Smith |
Added |
05-Mar-2022 16:05 |
Dr. John Smith |
Updated [Total fatalities, Other fatalities, Embed code] |
08-Mar-2022 20:26 |
DarianJ |
Updated [Registration, Source] |
09-Mar-2022 12:24 |
Dr. John Smith |
Updated [Cn, Source] |
09-Mar-2022 12:26 |
Dr. John Smith |
Updated [Departure airport] |
02-Oct-2022 20:29 |
Dr. John Smith |
Updated [Source] |
02-Nov-2023 10:08 |
harro |
Updated [[Source]] |
05-Mar-2024 18:18 |
Dr. John Smith |
Updated [Embed code] |
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