Loss of pressurization Incident de Havilland Canada DHC-8-102 VH-QQD,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 306052
 
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Date:Saturday 20 November 2021
Time:05:34
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-102
Owner/operator:Maroomba Airlines
Registration: VH-QQD
MSN: 245
Year of manufacture:1990
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 10
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Incident
Location:30 km north of Perth Airport, WA -   Australia
Phase: Initial climb
Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:Perth Airport, WA (PER/YPPH)
Destination airport:Port Hedland Airport, WA (PHE/YPPD)
Investigating agency: ATSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The DHC-8, registered VH‑QQD, departed on a charter flight from Perth to Port Hedland, Australia.
As the aircraft approached 10,000 ft, the flight crew carried out transition altitude checklist items and observed that the cabin had not pressurised. The flight crew decided to return to Perth and the aircraft landed uneventfully.

The aircraft had been undergoing maintenance on the day prior to the occurrence, and for operational reasons the recirculation fan had been removed for fitment to another aircraft. VH‑QQD had not been removed from the schedule as the assigned aircraft for the flight, and its unserviceability was not detected prior to flight. The absence of the recirculation fan on the occurrence flight prevented the aircraft from pressurising.

The operator’s operations department incorrectly interpreted a message from its engineering department regarding the serviceability status of VH‑QQD, and it remained assigned to the charter flight. This allocation remained on the flight crew’s roster and the flight manifest, which contributed to the flight crew’s confidence that the aircraft was serviceable.

As there were no allowable defects against the aircraft, the captain did not check the maintenance log prior to flight and, as a result, did not detect that the recirculation fan had been removed. However, during pre-flight activities the captain observed the circuit breaker that had been opened to facilitate the recirculation fan removal. The captain reset the circuit breaker without reviewing the maintenance log for recent or open defects as per the operator’s flight crew operating manual.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: ATSB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 2 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2021/aair/ao-2021-050

Revision history:

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