ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 308035
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| Date: | Saturday 11 April 2020 |
| Time: | 13:30 |
| Type: | DJI Inspire 2 - T650A |
| Owner/operator: | Dutch National Police |
| Registration: | PH-5MV |
| MSN: | |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Soestdijksekade, The Hague -
 Netherlands
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Aerial patrol |
| Departure airport: | Soestdijksekade, The Hague |
| Soestdijksekade, The Hague | |
| Investigating agency: | Dutch Safety Board |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The crew of PH-5MV, consisting of the pilot, the payload operator and two observers intended to perform a crowd observation and crowd control mission in the Zuiderpark, The Hague. The flight was performed with a DJI Inspire 2 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) with a camera payload. Shortly after take-off, during post take-off checks, the pilot lost control over the aircraft.
Shortly after take-off, the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) did not consistently respond to pilot input and eventually became uncontrollable due to an incorrectly calibrated compass. On the prior flight, a loudspeaker payload was used. This payload differed from the camera payload on the incident flight. During preparation of the incident flight, the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) software did not show a compass calibration warning and therefore the pilots did not recalibrate the compass.
The operator did not have procedures for compass calibration in relation to payload changes and relied on indications from the software. By doing so, the operator complied with the UAS manufacturer’s recommendation, which stresses to only calibrate the compass when indicated by the software. This investigation shows that the software is not able to detect an incorrectly calibrated compass in all cases. Therefore, it is advisable to manually start a compass calibration after a payload change, to prevent an unwanted compass offset that may lead to a loss of control.
After the loss of control, the pilot switched to the Return-To-Home (RTH) flight mode. This was in line with the operator’s procedures and the UAS manufacturer’s guidelines. However, the RTH flight mode also depends on the compass. Therefore, in some cases switching to the A(ttitude)-mode should be given priority because it eliminates the dependence on the compass. Switching to A-mode is advisable if the crew is unsure whether there is a compass malfunction because RTH still works when flying in A-mode.
This investigation shows that there are risks associated with using (different) payload. It is therefore important that users know those risks and take extra care when using different types of payload.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/16763/fly-away-na-kompasverstoring
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
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