ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 310059
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| Date: | Monday 27 May 2019 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  ATR 72-500 (72-212A) |
| Owner/operator: | Passaredo Transportes Aéreos |
| Registration: | PP-PTQ |
| MSN: | 874 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2009 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 61 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Ribeirão Preto-Leite Lopes Airport (SBRP) -
 Brazil
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport, GO (GYN/SBGO) |
| Ribeirão Preto-Leite Lopes Airport, SP (RAO/SBRP) | |
| Investigating agency: | CENIPA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
An ATR 72-500 (PP-PTQ) and a Eurocopter AS 350B2 (PR-NIA) were involved in a serious runway incursion incident.
The ATR 72 was on approach to Ribeirão Preto-Leite Lopes Airport (SBRP). At the same time the helicopter took off from runway 18 at SBRP at 11:39 UTC.
After taking off from runway 18, PR-NIA turned approximately 175° to the left and took the a heading of 008°.
While maintaining a parallel trajectory to runway 36 and close to it, PR-NIA conflicted with the ATR 72, which was performing the RNAV (GNSS) approach procedure Z RWY 18 at SBRP.
The ATR 72 radioed the Tower controller about the helicopter and the controller instructed the helicopter pilot to move away from the Runway 18 approach path.
The ATR 72 continued the approach and landed safely.
The minimum vertical separation was 400 feet.
Contributing factors.
- Piloting judgment – a contributor.
As a result of an inadequate assessment, the separation that the PR-NIA pilot established in relation to the PP-PTQ proved to be insufficient.
- Air Traffic planning (ATS) – a contributor.
Despite having followed what was recommended in the Operating Agreement in force on the date of the occurrence, the clearance transmitted by the controller that operated the TWR-RP to the PR-NIA did not establish a heading or a course that would guarantee the due separation from the PP- PTQ.
- Decision-making process – a contributor.
Even though he was aware that he should move away from the final approach of runway 18 and that there was other traffic preparing for the landing, the PR-NIA PIC decided to keep the ideal course to his destination. The pilot showed difficulty in realizing that the distance he established was inadequate and that it did not guarantee the minimum level of safety required for operations at the Ribeirão CTR.
Additionally, it was observed that the decision of the TWR-RP controller to leave it to the PR-NIA pilot to establish the separation from the PP-PTQ was also inappropriate.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
CENIPA
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 14 October 2021 | PP-PTQ | Voepass Linhas Aéreas | 0 | Presidente Prudente-A. De Barros Airport, SP (PPB/SBDN) | |
non |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 03-Apr-2023 09:58 | harro | Added |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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