ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 313961
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| Date: | Friday 16 June 2017 |
| Time: | 10:58 |
| Type: |  de Havilland Canada DHC-8-402Q Dash 8 |
| Owner/operator: | Austrian |
| Registration: | OE-LG. |
| MSN: | |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | BALAD waypoint -
 Austria
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Praha-Václav Havel Airport (PRG/LKPR) |
| Wien-Schwechat International Airport (VIE/LOWW) | |
| Investigating agency: | UUS Austria |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
A DHC-8-402 aircraft, was flying under instrument flight rules from Prague/Ruzyne Airport (LKPR) and was approaching Vienna/Schwechat Airport (LOWW). Originally, it was supposed to approach via the NERDU waypoint but was redirected to the left base of Runway 34 south of the airport to shorten the flight path.
The A319-112 aircraft, took off from Vienna/Schwechat Airport using instrument flight rules on Runway 29 and was cleared for a standard instrument departure on the SASAL 2 C route south of the airport. The destination was Podgorica in Montenegro (LYPG).
A loss of separation occurred as the A319 was cleared by the Vienna Radar Approach Control for a climb to Flight Level 230 while the DHC-8 was descending to approximately 7700 feet MSL. STCA atd TCAS activated and both flight crew followed their respective TCAS Resolution Advisories.
At the time of the airprox, the prescribed separation required a vertical separation of at least 1000 FT or a horizontal separation of at least 3 NM.
The closest separation between the two aircraft was 1.2 NM horizontally and 300 ft vertical.
Probable causes
- Confusion of "right" with "left" by the radar controller (EC) when instructing aircraft A to make a course change.
- Failure to instruct aircraft B to interrupt climb to resolve conflict with aircraft A.
Probable factors
- Prevailing cold front with thunderstorm activity in the Vienna TMA.
- Lack of listening capability of several aircraft which were in contact with the approach control station with the call sign WIEN RADAR.
- Overload of the radar controller (EC) due to weather-related course deviations, a resulting complex traffic situation and high frequency load.
- Update rate and delayed altitude display of the ATS monitoring system.
- Insufficient consideration of weather in sector planning.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
UUS
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 29-May-2023 12:16 | harro | Added |
| 12-Jul-2023 07:11 | harro | Updated |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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