ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 348744
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| Date: | Sunday 10 December 2023 |
| Time: | 10:19 |
| Type: |  Beechcraft A23-24 Musketeer Super III |
| Owner/operator: | Private |
| Registration: | N6945Q |
| MSN: | MA-295 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1968 |
| Engine model: | Lycoming IO-360-A2B |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | near Oklahoma City-Wiley Post Airport (PWA/KPWA), Oklahoma City, OK -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Oklahoma City-Wiley Post Airport, OK (PWA/KPWA) |
| Oklahoma City-Wiley Post Airport, OK (PWA/KPWA) | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
On December 10, 2023, about 1019 central standard time, a Beech A23-24 airplane, N6945Q, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The pilot and his passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to recordings of air traffic control (ATC) tower communications at Wiley Post Airport (PWA), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, about 1015:37, the pilot told the tower controller that he was holding short of runway 35R on taxiway A1 and was ready to depart to the north under visual flight rules (VFR). The tower controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff on runway 35R.
A review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) track data revealed that the airplane’s liftoff occurred before midfield and that the airplane was climbing though 300 ft above ground level (agl) as it flew over the end of runway 35R.
At 1016:57, a security camera located on a hangar near the east end of taxiway A5 captured the airplane in a climb from runway 35R. As the airplane continued the climb to the north there was possible evidence of intermittent smoke trailing behind the airplane.
According to ADS-B track data, after takeoff the airplane continued in the climb while on a north ground track, as shown in figure 1. About 1018:26, the airplane entered a left turn toward the south and the pilot told the tower controller, “we are going to return for landing.”
About 1018:39, the pilot told the tower controller, “we are losing power.” About 1018:45, the airplane was halfway through a 180° turn toward the airport when it entered a descent from about 2,100 ft mean sea level (msl). About 1018:52, the pilot stated that he was “declaring an emergency.” The tower controller subsequently cleared the pilot to land on the runway of his choice. About 1019:29, the tower controller stated that the surface wind was from 320° at 5 knots.
The ADS-B track data showed the airplane continued the descent toward the airport and became aligned with runway 17R. At 1019:50, the final ADS-B return was recorded about 0.5 mile north of the runway 17R threshold at an altitude of about 1,375 ft msl (100 ft agl). At that time, the airplane’s ground speed and vertical speed were 64 knots and -704 feet per minute, respectively.
The same security camera that captured the airplane’s takeoff from runway 35R also captured the airplane as it descended toward the airport. At 1019:13, the video footage showed the airplane descending with light colored smoke trailing the airplane. Beginning at 1020:04, dark smoke began rising from the accident site location.
Two witnesses reported there was smoke trailing from the airplane and that the engine was running rough shortly before the accident. One witness noted that the trailing smoke was a gray/white color. A third witness stated that the engine was sputtering as it flew over his position and then it made a 180° turn toward the airport
The aircraft impacted a 15-foot-tall pile of concrete rubble at a concrete recycling facility on an approximate 180° heading. The upper portion of nose landing gear, the nose gear fork, nose wheel and tire, and the right main landing gear were found separated among the top of the rubble, as shown in figure 2. Tire markings and red paint transfer (matching the aircraft color) were observed on multiple pieces of concrete. One of the tire tracks was outlined by an oily substance consistent with engine oil. The fractured nose gear segment and nose wheel tire were coated with a thin layer of what appeared to be engine oil, as shown in figure 3. The right lower portion of the cowling, also coated with oil, came to rest next to the nose gear segment. The outboard six feet of the right wing fracture separated and came to rest inverted at the bottom of the rubble pile and sustained significant thermal damage that consumed portions of the skin.
The main wreckage came to rest in an open grass area on a south-southwest heading about 40 ft beyond the concrete rubble pile, as shown in figure 4. The main wreckage included the fuselage, engine, propeller, left wing, inboard portion of the right wing, and tail section. The left main landing gear separated from the wing and was found about 60 ft past the main wreckage. All structural components and flight control surfaces were located at the accident site.
Most of the wreckage sustained heavy thermal damage that consumed the fuselage skin and structure. The inboard portion of the right-wing separated at the wing root and came to rest beside the fuselage. Thermally damaged portions of the horizontal stabilator and the tail beacon were identified beneath the fire damaged section of the cockpit and right wing. The upper surface of the right-wing integral fuel tank was consumed by fire. The left-wing upper skins forward of the main spar from the root to the aileron were mostly consumed by fire.
An examination of the flight control system was limited due to the extent of thermal damage; however, there was no evidence of a flight control cable separation. The flap selector assembly was found in the flaps retracted position. The airframe examination revealed no evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation
The airplane was normally parked in a hangar located at the southeast corner of PWA. Examination of the hangar revealed 11 empty 1-quart bottles of Aeroshell W100 engine oil. Additionally, there was evidence of minor oil puddling on the asphalt floor and a discernable nose wheel tire tread track in oil, as shown in figure 5.
There was no evidence of an oil leak on the asphalt between the hangar door and the unmarked asphalt taxiway alongside the row of hangars.
There was evidence of a significant oil leak with puddling on the unmarked asphalt taxiway, as shown in figure 6, consistent with the airplane being stationary for an extended period with the engine running. Additionally, there was evidence of oil spray from the propeller wash blowing oil aft. The nose landing gear deposited an easily discernable, dark black, oily, tire track as the airplane moved toward taxiway C1.
There was evidence of a smaller oil puddle near where the unmarked asphalt taxiway transitioned onto concrete taxiway C1, as shown in figure 7.
There was evidence of oil drips and nose wheel tire tracks on taxiway C1, as shown in figure 8. The oil drips and nose wheel track continued to the runup pad.
There was evidence of a significant oil leak with puddling on the runup pad, as shown in figure 9 and figure 10, consistent with the airplane being stationary for an extended period with the engine running. Additionally, there was evidence of oil spray caused by the propeller wash blowing oil aft.
Additional oil drips and nose wheel tire tracks were evident as the airplane taxied from the runup pad toward the hold short lines for runway 35R.
There was evidence of an oil leak where the airplane came to stop before the hold short lines for runway 35R, as shown in figure 11.
The engine remained attached to the mounts, and the mount remained attached to the firewall. There was significant evidence that engine sustained substantial thermal damage during the postimpact fire, as shown in figure 12. The exhaust was crushed upward and aft. The rear of the oil sump and lower portion of the accessory case was consumed by fire. There was an opening punched out of the top of engine case inboard of the No. 2 cylinder base, as shown in figure 13. There were also multiple holes punched out of the lower side of the engine case inside the oil sump, between cylinder Nos. 1 and 2. Connecting rods Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were found broken and deformed. Numerous pieces of connecting rod, rod caps, and rod bolts were found in remaining portion of engine oil sump, as shown in figure 14. There was a crack of the forward lower left crankcase between base of cylinder No. 2 and the case split. Visual examination inside of the crankcase (through the crankcase holes and by borescope inspection) and the cylinder rocker boxes generally revealed a lack of oil wetting of the internal drivetrain components, consistent with prolonged heat exposure during the postimpact fire.
The remote mounted oil filter assembly was found deformed by fire. The oil filter was safety tied with 0.02-inch safety wire. The oil hoses were found thermally damaged and separated from the remote oil filter assembly and the filter adapter, as shown in figure 15. The aluminum fittings were found melted. The oil cooler was also mostly consumed by fire with only the center core remaining. The oil cooler hoses were found separated from the oil cooler assembly with the attach fittings mostly consumed by fire, as shown in figure 16. Both the supply and return hose ends at the oil cooler assembly contained resolidified aluminum, consistent with the fittings being in place during the postimpact fire. The oil cooler hoses remained attached at the rear of the engine. All oil and fuel hoses were thermally compromised.
The cylinders were borescope inspected with no anomalies observed. The No. 2 exhaust push rod shroud tube was found dislodged. Numerous shroud tubes were thermally deformed. All oil drain-back tubes exhibited significant thermal damage consistent with prolonged exposure to fire.
The propeller governor drive adapter was found dislodged from accessory case. The propeller governor was mostly consumed by fire. The propeller governor oil line separated from the steel fitting at the governor and where it returns into the crankcase with both aluminum B-nuts consumed by fire.
Both magnetos were found thermally deformed during the postimpact fire. All ignition leads were thermally damaged. The top spark plugs electrodes appeared worn, with a dark sooty appearance.
The fuel servo was found fractured separated from its flange. The servo was found partially deformed. The throttle and mixture cables remained attached to their respective arms. The flow divider was found partially deformed, with the diaphragm consumed by fire. The engine driven fuel pump was also found mostly thermally damaged.
The initial source of the engine oil leak could not be conclusively determined due to mechanical damage sustained during multiple connecting rod separations and thermal damage sustained during the postimpact fire
The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft. The pitch change mechanism and spring were separated from the front of the hub. The blades remained attached and did not move freely. The outboard third of Blade A was melted along the training edge. The blade was bent aft about 10º midspan. Blade B was bent forward 10º midspan. Neither blade exhibited leading edge scoring or gouging.
The airplane’s recording tachometer was destroyed by the postimpact fire which prevented calculation of the airplane’s airframe and engine times at the time of the accident. Additionally, the airplane’s logbooks were not located during the on-scene investigation, which prevented a comprehensive review of the airplane’s maintenance history. An aviation mechanic, who had recently worked on the airplane, provided copies of three logbook pages, two recent logbook entries, and a prebuy inspection report.
According to available maintenance documentation, the last major overhaul of the Lycoming IO-360-A2B engine, s/n L-3904-51A, was completed on June 6, 2005, at 924.9 hours since new. On December 24, 2008, at 240.3 hours since major overhaul (SMOH), all four cylinders were removed and overhauled due to low compression and excessive oil consumption.
On April 15, 2023, during the last annual inspection, at 683.8 hours SMOH, the engine oil and oil filter were replaced, No. 1 cylinder was serviced due to low compression. The No. 1 cylinder bore was honed, and new gaskets and hold-down nuts installed. The airplane was returned to service following an engine ground run and subsequent test flight that did not reveal any oil leaks or anomalies. The associated engine log entry indicated that the engine had been inspected in accordance with an annual inspection and determined to be in an airworthy condition.
According to FAA registration records, the pilot purchased the airplane on June 30, 2023. A prebuy inspection report, dated June 22, 2023, indicated that the airplane’s airframe total time (AFTT) and engine SMOH were 1,585.1 hours and 684.5 hours, respectively.
On November 11, 2023, at 699.5 hours SMOH, the engine oil and oil filter were replaced, and an oil sample was submitted to a laboratory for analysis. The airplane was returned to service following an engine test run that did not reveal any oil leaks or anomalies.
The oil analysis report, dated December 5, 2023, indicated elevated levels of aluminum, chromium, and iron. The laboratory commented that there was “a lot of metal in this sample” and that internal corrosion could be an issue if the airplane had been sitting. The laboratory suggested a borescope inspection, compression test, monitor oil temperature, and check the oil filter for evidence of metal. Additionally, the laboratory report stated that an excessive oil consumption could also be an indication of engine issues.
On December 1, 2023, at 708.4 hours SMOH, a E-Z Heat oil sump heater was installed on the engine.
Editor note: the report contains 16 figures, download it to view them (too much to post here!)
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
https://www.news9.com/story/6575e6b4b3e950064f69cd11/1-dead-1-critically-injured-in-okc-plane-crash-
https://eu.oklahoman.com/story/news/2023/12/10/okc-emergency-crews-respond-to-plane-crash-near-wiley-post-airport/71871055007/
https://www.news9.com/story/6575e6b4b3e950064f69cd11/2-killed-after-plane-crashes-in-oklahoma-city
NTSB
https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=6945Q
https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=a93ca8&lat=35.558&lon=-97.650&zoom=15.8&showTrace=2023-12-10&trackLabels
https://archive.liveatc.net/kpwa/KPWA3-Twr-Dec-10-2023-1600Z.mp3
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 10-Dec-2023 16:46 | gerard57 | Added |
| 10-Dec-2023 17:35 | gerard57 | Updated [Total fatalities, Source, Narrative] |
| 10-Dec-2023 17:37 | harro | Updated [Total occupants, Other fatalities, Phase, Nature, Source] |
| 10-Dec-2023 17:40 | harro | Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Other fatalities, Phase, Departure airport, Source] |
| 10-Dec-2023 17:42 | harro | Updated [Other fatalities, Location, Narrative] |
| 10-Dec-2023 17:43 | harro | Updated [Other fatalities] |
| 10-Dec-2023 17:51 | harro | Updated [Other fatalities, Source, Damage, Narrative] |
| 10-Dec-2023 18:50 | Dan Gryder | Updated [Narrative] |
| 11-Dec-2023 07:08 | OkcPatriot | Updated [Total fatalities, Source, Narrative] |
| 11-Dec-2023 17:15 | johnwg | Updated [Time, Nature, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Category] |
| 13-Dec-2023 17:51 | Anon. | Updated [Embed code] |
| 04-Jan-2024 20:28 | Captain Adam | Updated [Time, Location, Source, Embed code, Narrative, Accident report] |
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