ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 385252
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Date: | Wednesday 18 January 2023 |
Time: | 10:17 |
Type: | General Atomics MQ-9A Reaper |
Owner/operator: | USAF, opb i3 |
Registration: | 11-4123 |
MSN: | |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | Victorville-Southern California Logistics Airport, CA (VCV/KVCV) -
United States of America
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Phase: | Take off |
Nature: | Military |
Departure airport: | Victorville-Southern California Logistics Airport, CA (VCV/KVCV) |
Destination airport: | Victorville-Southern California Logistics Airport, CA (VCV/KVCV) |
Investigating agency: | USAF AIB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:On the morning of 18 January 2023 at approximately 1017 local time, a MQ-9A Reaper, the Mishap Aircraft (MA), belonging to the 432nd Wing, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada and on-loan to Integrated Innovation, Incorporated (i3), impacted Runway 17 at Southern California Logistics Airport (SCLA), Victorville, California. The accident destroyed the MA’s radome, Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS), lower data-link antenna, all three-landing gear, and engine. The MA was being operated by a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) from the contract firm i3, comprised of the Mishap Pilot (MP) and the Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO). Additionally, a Mishap Safety Observer Instructor Pilot (MSOIP) and Mishap Safety Observer Sensor Operator (MSOSO) were present at the Ground Control Station (GCS). Both mishap safety observers are employed by i3.
The mishap resulted in no reported damage to civilian property, no injuries, and no fatalities. The loss of government property is valued at $16,111,000.00.
During pre-flight ground operations, while performing the Angle of Attack (AOA) safety checks with the MA crew chief, the MP failed to recognize the MA AOA was outside of the parameters outlined in the Technical Order (TO). During the initial engine run-up during the first stages of takeoff, MP confirmed all instrument indications were good. The calculated aircraft rotation speed for this flight was 78 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). No verbal crew acknowledgment of the rotation speed was heard during the takeoff sequence once the MA achieved 78 KIAS. Between 82-83 KIAS, the MSO verbalized “ABORT!” The MP acknowledged the “ABORT” call and executed takeoff abort procedures at 91 KIAS. Both the MP and MSO recognized the MA was airborne at 92 KIAS. The MA climbed to an altitude of 18 feet above ground level (AGL). The MP subsequently directed the MSO to, “Kill the GDT (Ground Data Terminal).” The MSO toggled the GDT kill switch while the aircraft was stalled (67 KIAS, 2 feet AGL over the centerline of the runway). The MA then lost all remote-control connectivity with the GCS as it impacted the runway and drove off the paved runway surface, destroying previously listed components.
The Accident Investigation Board President (AIBP) found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the MP’s decision to “Kill the GDT” causing lost link, while the MA was 2 feet AGL and 67 KIAS. Due to the lost datalink, the MA departed the prepared runway surface subsequently destroying the MA radome, sensor suite, landing gear, and engine. The AIBP found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that three factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) The MP failing to recognize the AOA checks being out of Technical Order (TO) limits
during ground operations; (2) the MSO’s failure to verbalize “ROTATE” at rotation airspeed; and (3) the MSO’s failure to recognize the aircraft was beyond rotation airspeed during the “ABORT” command.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | USAF AIB |
Report number: | |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 2 months |
Download report: | Final report |
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Sources:
USAF
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
04-Apr-2024 14:26 |
ASN |
Added |
04-Apr-2024 14:26 |
ASN |
Updated [Time, Location] |
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