Accident Piper PA-32R-301 N8230G,
ASN logo
ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 387345
 
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Date:Sunday 3 September 2000
Time:13:46 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic P32R model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Piper PA-32R-301
Owner/operator:Private
Registration: N8230G
MSN: 32R-8013102
Total airframe hrs:1458 hours
Engine model:Lycoming IO-540
Fatalities:Fatalities: / Occupants: 3
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Category:Accident
Location:South Kingstown, RI -   United States of America
Phase: En route
Nature:Private
Departure airport:Chatham, MA (KCQX)
Destination airport:Philadelphia, PA (KPNE)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The airplane was headed southwest, level at 8,000 feet, either in, or above instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot was instructed to change radio frequency, and after he checked in with the next sector controller, no further transmissions were heard from him. The airplane descended to 7,400 feet, then climbed to 8,500 feet over a period of 4 minutes. It remained at 8,500 feet for about a minute, then descended to and maintained between 8,100 and 8,200 feet for another minute. The airplane then made a descending turn to the right, with rates of descent up to approximately 16,000 feet per minute. The wreckage path was 1,900 feet in length, and began with parts from the airplane's tail section. About 500 feet from the beginning, was a section of the right wing, and 400 feet beyond that, the entire left wing. The stabilator spar and left wing separations exhibited downwards bending. The airplane was equipped with a vacuum-driven attitude indicator (AI) and directional gyro (DG). It also had a standby vacuum system, which required a reduction of power to properly operate. One low-vacuum annunciator light exhibited filament characteristics consistent with its being lit at the time of the accident. The other light was a diode-type, and could only be/was tested as operational. Post-accident examination found that the vacuum pump flex coupling was sheared, and the vacuum-driven instruments did not exhibit any rotational scoring. The vacuum pump coupling was manufactured in 1979. The manufacturer recommended changing the coupling every 6 years. There was no regulatory requirement to change the coupling, nor was there any regulatory requirement for redundant systems in case of vacuum system failure.

Probable Cause: The pilot's loss of control, and his subsequent overstress of the airplane after a vacuum system failure during flight in instrument meteorological conditions. Factors included the instrument meteorological conditions, a sheared coupling on the vacuum pump, the pilot/owner's failure to ensure the coupling was changed per the manufacturer's recommendations, a lack of regulatory requirement to ensure compliance with the manufacturer's recommendations, and a lack of regulatory requirement to ensure installation of a suitable backup system.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: NYC00FA248
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 4 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

NTSB NYC00FA248

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
03-May-2024 08:03 ASN Update Bot Added

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2024 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org