Incident Gloster Meteor F.8 A77-415,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 86416
 
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Date:Thursday 11 June 1953
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic METR model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Gloster Meteor F.8
Owner/operator:77 Sqn RAAF
Registration: A77-415
MSN:
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Location:Kimpo -   South Korea
Phase: Combat
Nature:Military
Departure airport:
Destination airport:
Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources
Narrative:
EJECTION AND PARACHUTE DESCENT
FROM BATTLE DAMAGED METEOR VIII

Pilot :Flg. Off. J. M Coleman (607145) R.A.F.
Squadron: No. 77 T/7 squadron R.A.A.F.
Mission: R/P strike
Aircraft: A77-415
Date: 22nd June, 1953

NARRATIVE:
On the morning of June 22nd, I was flying in the number three position in a section of four aircraft briefed to attack troops and supply shelters in North Korea. Four sections took part in this attack and I was in the third.

There was some flak, and after the attack I broke starboard and commenced to weave away.

At that moment there was a large explosion behind me and the port rudder pedal slammed forward and stayed there. I was a bit shaken but as the aircraft continued to climb I realised that I was in no immediate difficulty so I set about checking my cockpit. There seemed to be no actual damage in the cockpit itself and I still had elevator and aileron control and the use of the starboard rudder. I tried to call my leader but the radio was dead and I changed to the number two set and continued to check as I waited for it to warm up. That set did not work either.

Inspection revealed that I had no electrics at all, the A.S.I. was indicating safe[?] and the rudder and elevator trim wouldn’t work. It occurred to me that I might have been hit in the ventral tank so I tried to jettison it but couldn’t move the handle.

By this time I was catching the rest of the formation and tried to throttle back but both throttles were jammed fully forward so I put out the airbrakes. I was rather surprised to find that they worked. Airbrakes, however, reduced the speed too much so I put them in again. When I tried to use them again they didn’t work. The only other way I could think of slowing down was to stop one engine but on consideration I decided to wait until I was in friendly territory before doing that. In any case both high pressure cocks and port low pressure cock were jammed.

All during this period the aircraft had been climbing and by this time I had passed my section and levelled out at 15,000 feet. There was considerable back force on the control column. In the hope that the I.F.F. was working I squawked ‘Mayday’.

I realised that I had no chance of crash landing and began to think about ejecting. I decided to do it as near to base as possible. Base was covered with cloud but I caught glimpses of the ?ahn river and saw Seoul through a gap in the cloud. There was no cloud to the east of Seoul so I decided to eject there. At this stage I closed the starboard low pressure cock which reduced the backward stick loading a little.

I was still at fifteen thousand feet and decided against descending because the aircraft appeared to be going quite fast and I didn’t want it to go any faster in case it broke up. The only external damage I could see from the cockpit was a small dent in the port engine cowling.

By this time the rest of the section had caught up with me and the leader pointed towards base. I signalled that I was going to eject and did a few orbits while I got my courage up. I decided there was no point in delaying any further and jettisoned the hood. A great deal of dirt flew up off the floor as the hood went.

I put my feet on the seat stirrups and pulled the blind. I felt the slack in the blind taken up and gave a hard tug. The seat got away cleanly. My next impression was of spinning wildly but the seat steadied up as the stabilising drogue was fired. When I began to think coherently again I released the blind which flew up immediately and undid my seat harness. I fell forward then realised that something, probably the oxygen lead, was still connecting me to the seat but after I had waved my arms about a bit I fell clear and started to tumble. When I straightened my legs the tumbling stopped and I found myself on my back in a slightly head down attitude. It wasn’t an unpleasant sensation but I didn’t feel disposed to enjoy it indefinitely so I looked down for the ‘D’ ring and pulled it with both hands. I felt the rigging lines pay out then there was a sharp jerk as the canopy developed and something jabbed in the groin. I think it was the left leg strap buckle.

The time of descent must have been at least ten minutes because I used all my emergency oxygen during it. During the latter stages of descent I heard and saw a Meteor capping['combat air patrol' = 'looking after'] me. I tried to slip the parachute towards some paddy fields without success and eventually landed on soft earth on top of a high ridge and rolled into a gully. The landing was quite light and I found myself unhurt if a little shaken.

I released the harness with a little difficulty, merely because I’d forgotten to undo the retaining clip on the quick release box. By this time I was surrounded by South Koreans who seemed very friendly.

Shortly afterwards I saw a helicopter and having signalled it was picked up ten minutes later and taken back to base.

My helmet (leather) and sun glasses remained in place all through the descent.

Conclusions
1. The combat boots issued in this theatre are exceptionally good value from the point of view of parachute landings. They give very good ankle support. I suggest they be issued in preference to the normal flying boot. The shoe part could be lined with fleece for use in cold weather.

2. I am convinced that I would have felt more comfortable when the ‘chute opened and during the descent if I had paid more attention to the fitting of my parachute. The importance of a correctly fitting harness cannot be over -emphasised.

3. It would be a good idea to use a vacuum cleaner to clean cockpit floors periodically so the large quantities of dirt don’t fly about when the hood is jettisoned.

4. It is a good idea to carry extra day-night flares under combat conditions. I used both of those in the dinghy pack before the helicopter arrived and consequently could not indicate the wind direction to the pilot.

5. Using an ejector seat is more frightening before you do it and after you’ve done it than while you’re doing it.

[signed and dated]Circumstances unknown.

Sources:

1. http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/korea/reports/air/
2. http://www.adf-gallery.com.au//2a77.shtml
3. http://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/oz/77/MK8OPS.htm
4. http://www.air-britain.com/pdfs/sampleaeromil.pdf
5. http://web.archive.org/web/20171115111244/http://www.ejection-history.org.uk:80/project/year_pages/1953.htm#jun

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
21-Mar-2016 18:16 Anon. Updated [Narrative]
25-Oct-2017 23:39 Dr. John Smith Updated [Operator, Location, Country, Phase, Source, Narrative]
25-Oct-2017 23:39 Dr. John Smith Updated [Aircraft type]
12-Nov-2018 09:08 Nepa Updated [Operator, Operator]

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